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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff was injured on October 11, 1984. He filed his 
product liability complaint against defendant, Sturm, Ruger & 
Company, Inc. ("Ruger"), on October 13, 1988. Does the ap-
plicable four-year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-25(3), bar plaintiff's action? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Course of Proceedings Below 
The District Court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on November 2, 1989 because plaintiff's action was 
barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The Notice of 
Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals was filed November 28, 1989. 
That court transferred the case to this Court on January 5, 1990. 
Facts 
On October 11, 1984, plaintiff sustained a gunshot wound 
from the discharge of a revolver.1" The gun in question is a 
Ruger .44 Magnum caliber, Super Blackhawk single-action revolver. 
Plaintiff contends that the revolver was defective. 
According to plaintiff, he was placing the revolver into a 
truck when the gun slipped out of its holster and hit the running 
board of the truck. The revolver discharged, wounding the plain-
x
 Although the complaint alleged that the injury occurred "on 
or about" October 20, 1984, plaintiff has stated in his deposition 
and affidavit that the injury occurred on October 11, 1984. (R. 
52-53.) 
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tiff. (Supp. R. 56, 80-81.) Plaintiff testified that the hammer 
of the revolver was in the safety position when he dropped the 
gun. (Supp. R. 60-61.) Plaintiff knew before and after the 
accident that the gun was manufactured by Ruger. (Supp. R. 28.) 
Plaintiff asserts that he did not discover his potential 
cause of action until he received legal advice from his attorney 
several months before the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions. (R. 53.) The complaint, however, was not filed until 
October 13, 1988, by the same attorney who had months previously 
advised plaintiff of his potential cause of action. (See id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Every event necessary to form the basis of plaintiff's 
product liability lawsuit occurred more than four years before he 
filed his complaint. The suit is therefore barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
Plaintiff was injured by a sudden and traumatic event from a 
known cause. Plaintiff advocates adoption of a novel version of 
the discovery rule that would toll the limitations period until a 
potential plaintiff seeks legal advice. Such a rule would effec-
tively negate the statute of limitations. 
Courts applying Utah law have permitted plaintiffs the 
benefit of the discovery rule only when the injury or the in-
strumentality causing the injury were unknowable to the injured 
party. In this case, plaintiff knew immediately that he had been 
shot by a gun which he believed was on safety when he dropped it. 
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Plaintiff knew before and after the accident that the gun was 
manufactured by Ruger. Thus, there are no "exceptional cir-
cumstances" which would make enforcement of the statute of limi-
tations "irrational or unjust." 
In addition to the lack of "exceptional circumstances", the 
discovery rule does not apply in this case because plaintiff 
learned of his potential legal cause of action before the limita-
tions period expired. Plaintiff concedes his attorney advised 
him months before the expiration of the limitations period that 
he had a potential legal action against Ruger. This court has 
previously decided that when a plaintiff discovers an injury and 
its cause before the limitations period expires, the discovery 
rule does not apply. Plaintiff admittedly had more than ample 
time to reach the courthouse before the statute ran. His suit is 
barred. 
Plaintiff's argument that application of statute of limita-
tions would violate the "Open Courts" provision of the Utah 
Constitution is waived because it was not presented in the trial 
court. Even were the argument not waived, it would be meritless. 
This court has held unconstitutional statutes of repose that 
barred suits before causes of action accrued. The instant case, 
however, involves application of a statute of limitations, not a 
statute of repose. Here the statute of limitations extinguished 
plaintiff's cause of action four years after it had accrued. 
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Plaintifffs last argument, that the limitations period 
should be tolled based on the statute which tolls limitations 
during disability, is also without merit. A hospital stay is not 
the kind of disability the statute addresses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL EVENTS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE PLAINTIFF'S 
CAUSE OF ACTION OCCURRED MORE THAN FOUR YEARS 
BEFORE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED. 
The governing policy under Utah law concerning statutes of 
limitations is that they: 
"are designed to promote justice by preventing sur-
prises through the revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memo-
ries have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." In 
furtherance of that policy, the general rule is that a 
cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action. Under 
that rule, mere ignorance of the existence of a cause 
of action does not prevent the running of the statute 
of limitations. 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 
342, 348-49 (1944)). The last event necessary to complete plain-
tiff's cause of action was his injury on October 11, 1984. On 
that date, plaintiff knew he was injured. He knew that the 
injury was the result of the discharge of a gun which went off 
when dropped, even though he believed it to be on safety. He 
knew the manufacturer of the gun, which he owned and has retained 
since the accident. Thus, October 11, 1984, is the date his 
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cause of action accrued for limitations purposes. Myers, 635 
P.2d at 86; see also McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724 F. 
Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989). 
It is not disputed on appeal that the four-year statute of 
limitations governing an "action for relief not otherwise provi-
ded by law" applies to plaintifffs claim. Utah Code Ann. S 78-
12-25(3). Accordingly, the last day on which plaintiff could 
file an action based upon his accident was October 11, 1988. 
Plaintiff admits that the complaint was not filed until Octo-
ber 13, 1988.2 These undisputed facts establish that the action 
is barred by limitations, as the district court correctly ruled. 
A. Application of the Legislatively Determined 
Limitations Period to Plaintiff's Claim Is 
Essential to Preserve the Integrity and 
Purpose of the Statute of Limitations. 
In an attempt to avoid operation of the statute of limita-
tions, plaintiff contends that the "discovery rule" delayed 
accrual of his claim until his lawyer advised him of his legal 
rights. That contention is without merit. 
1, The discovery rule does not apply to actions 
involving sudden, traumatic injuries from a 
known cause. 
2
 Plaintiff's brief contends that the complaint was mailed 
from Salt Lake City on October 11, 1984. The mailing of the 
complaint on the last day, however, is of no help to plaintiff. 
Rule 3(a), U.R.C.P., provides: "A civil action is commenced (1) 
by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by the service of a 
summons." Under the unequivocal language of the rule, plaintiff's 
action was not commenced until October 13, 1988. 
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When a plaintiff has been injured by a sudden, traumatic 
event, the discovery rule does not apply. In Jackson v. Layton 
City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987), this court rejected the conten-
tion that the discovery rule should apply to a case involving 
personal injuries resulting from a sledding accident which oc-
curred when the plaintiff's tube collided with a metal pole. The 
court noted that ff[t]he defect, if it was such, was patent, and 
there was no injury inflicted that was unknown at the time of its 
infliction." Id. at 1199. The court observed that plaintiff was 
"well aware of the collision." Id. 
In McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724 F. Supp. 835 (D. 
Utah 1989), an electronic gate knocked plaintiff down. The 
plaintiff missed the limitations deadline and asked the court to 
apply the discovery rule. Plaintiff claimed he had only recently 
learned the accident had been caused by negligent installation of 
the gate. The court refused to apply the discovery rule, holding 
"the 'discovery rule' does not apply where plaintiff has timely 
access to or actual knowledge regarding the nature and cause of 
his injury and potentially liable parties." Id. at 839. 
Other courts have also distinguished latent injuries from 
sudden, traumatic injuries. In Much v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 502 
F. Supp. 743 (D. Mont. 1980), plaintiff was injured when his 
holstered revolver discharged into his leg while he was crawling 
under some brush. Plaintiff filed suit after the expiration of 
the limitations period and attempted to invoke the discovery 
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rule. The court noted that the Montana Supreme Court (like the 
Utah Supreme Court) had only applied the discovery rule to la-
tent, undiscovered injuries and held the claim time-barred. The 
court reasoned that: 
To allow a plaintiff, who fails to inquire into the 
cause of injury, to avoid the time bar under the guise 
of "discovery" would hopelessly demolish the protection 
afforded defendants by the statute. 
Id. at 745. 
In addition to Montana, courts from other jurisdictions have 
also refused to extend the discovery rule to actions concerning 
sudden, traumatic injuries. In Snell v. Columbia Sun Exchange, 
Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981), the South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began to run 
at the time of the unexpected discharge of the firearm and not 
when legal counsel was sought. Likewise, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has ruled that: 
where the injury results from a sudden traumatic event, 
it is not difficult to pinpoint the precise time the 
injury occurs, i.e., at the time the sudden traumatic 
event occurs. Moreover, the view urged on us by the 
plaintiff in the case would effectively render the 
statute of limitations meaningless because under the 
plaintiff's view the limitations period would not begin 
to run until the plaintiff retained an attorney who was 
willing to file a lawsuit more than three years after 
the sudden traumatic event causing the injury. 
Id. at p. 518. See also LePretre v. Petre Bros., Inc., 113 111. 
App. 3d 484, 487, 447 N.E.2d 551 (3rd Dist. 1983) (holding that 
"where injuries are sustained as a result of a sudden traumatic 
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August 28, 1990 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq. 
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Re: Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. 
No. 90004 
Dear Geoff: 
In checking for new cases which might bear on the issues of 
this case, we came across a citation error in our respondent's 
brief. At page 8, we inadvertently attributed a quotation to the 
case previously cited, while it should have been attributed to 
Lofton v. General Motors Corporation, 694 F.2d 514, 518 (7th 
cir., 1982). 
I have appended a corrected page and will appreciate your 
calling our oversight and this correction to the Court's 
attention. 
Very truly yours, 
fi\ James Clegg 
HJC:tna 
06\HJC\15077.001\C0RRECTN.LTR 
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Id. at 745. 
In addition to Montana, courts from other jurisdictions have 
also refused to extend the discovery rule to actions concerning 
sudden, traumatic injuries. In Snell v. Columbia Sun Exchange, 
Inc., 276 S.C. 301, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981), the South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began to run at 
the time of the unexpected discharge of the firearm and not when 
legal counsel was sought. Likewise, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has ruled that: 
where the injury results from a sudden traumatic event, 
it is not difficult to pinpoint the precise time the 
injury occurs, i.e., at the time the sudden traumatic 
event occurs. Moreover, the view urged on us by the 
plaintiff in the case would effectively render the 
statute of limitations meaningless because under the 
plaintiff's view the limitations period would not begin 
to run until the plaintiff retained an attorney who was 
willing to file a lawsuit more than three years after 
the sudden traumatic event causing the injury. 
Lofton v. General Motors Corporation, 694 F.2d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 
1982). See also LePretre v. Petre Bros., Inc., 113 111. App. 3d 
484, 487, 447 N.E.2d 551 (3rd Dist. 1983) (holding that 
"where injuries are sustained as a result of a sudden traumatic 
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event, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time when 
the injury occurs.11) 
Plaintiff's reliance on stone v. Colt Industries Operating 
Corp., 1986 WL 13073 (D. Mass. 1986), is misplaced. Applying 
Massachusetts law, the Stone court permitted plaintiff to proceed 
with his suit because he alleged he did not learn the product was 
defective until after the statute of limitations had expired. 
The Stone court relied on Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Co., 714 F.2d 
192 (1st Cir. 1983), as the basis for its decision. However, a 
reading of the Fidler decision demonstrates that the Stone court 
inaccurately applied the decision. 
In Fidler, plaintiff was injected with a contrast dye in 
1973. The dye lodged in her body, causing pain. The appellate 
court, affirming summary judgment for the defendant, ruled that 
the statute of limitations began to run when plaintiff was told 
by a doctor in 1978 that the dye might be the medical cause of 
her pain. The court concluded that there was no indication that 
"the notice necessary to start the statute running includes 
notice that defendant has breached a legal duty.11 714 F.2d at 
199. Under Fidler, once a plaintiff knows he has been injured by 
defendant's product, he is on notice and has a duty to inves-
tigate whether he has a legal claim. In the interim, the limita-
tions period continues to run. Fidler, and as a result, Stone, 
provide no support whatsoever for plaintiff's claim that the 
statute did not begin to run until his attorney advised him that 
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Ruger might have breached a legal duty. Applying Pidler, it is 
clear that knowledge of the cause of the injury (here the dis-
charge of the gun), not the legal cause of action, is what trig-
gers the statute. 
Plaintiff's allegation that he was unaware of the alleged 
defect in the gun until the spring of 1988 is nothing more than 
an allegation of "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of 
action," and does not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations. Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. Reduced to its simplest 
terms, plaintiff's argument is that a person who sustains a known 
injury from a known source is not subject to the operation of the 
statute of limitations until the person receives advice from an 
attorney that he possesses a legally cognizable claim. If the 
discovery rule were extended to such circumstances, the statute 
of limitations would be rendered virtually meaningless. Plain-
tiffs would be free to sit on their rights without exercising any 
diligence to investigate their potential causes of action. 
Meanwhile, the goal of preventing stale claims and promoting 
resolution of disputes while evidence is available and memories 
fresh would be frustrated. 
2. There exist no "exceptional circumstances" 
justifying application of the "discovery 
rule" in the case at bar. 
According to well-settled Utah law, the discovery rule 
applies only in three limited circumstances: 
In some areas of the law, the discovery rule is incor-
porated into the statute whereby the statute does not 
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begin to run until the facts forming the basis for the 
cause of action are discovered. In other circumstan-
ces, concealment or misleading by a party prevents that 
party from relying on the statute of limitations. 
Finally, where there are exceptional circumstances that 
would make application of the general rule irrational 
or unjust, this Court has adopted the discovery rule by 
judicial action. 
Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) 
(footnotes omitted). None of these circumstances are involved 
here: This case does not involve a statute which incorporates a 
discovery rule; there are no allegations of fraudulent conceal-
ment; and there are no "exceptional circumstances" that would 
make the application of the normal rule irrational or unjust. 
The courts of this state have uniformly held that the discovery 
rule is not applicable in such circumstances. 
Plaintiff relies on the final category—"exceptional cir-
cumstances." That category applies only when application of the 
general limitations bar would be unjust or irrational. Brigham 
Young University v. Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 
(Utah 1987). In Myers, for example, the plaintiffs were con-
fronted with a unique hardship because they were unaware of the 
death of their ward until after the limitations period had ex-
pired and, consequently, "had no alternative to bring their 
action after the statutory limitation period had expired." 
Myers, 635 P.2d at 87.3 Unlike Myers, the plaintiff in the case 
3
 The case of Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter International, 694 
P.2d 143 (Alaska, 1984), is misleadingly cited by plaintiff as 
holding that the limitations period is tolled if the "negligent 
act is for whatever circumstances unknown or unknowable." Brief 
(continued...) 
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at bar knew immediately of his injury and the identity of the 
injury-producing instrumentality. Thus, plaintiff was not sub-
ject to any similar hardship in learning of the accrual of his 
potential cause of action. 
This Court has used the discovery rule to extend the limita-
tions periods in other clearly defined and narrowly limited cir-
cumstances. In a medical malpractice case decided under the 
four-year limitation provision of § 78-12-25(2), this Court held 
that 
where a foreign object is negligently left in the body 
of a patient during an operation and the patient is 
ignorant of that fact, and consequently his right of 
action for malpractice, the cause of action does not 
accrue until the patient learned of the presence of 
such foreign object in his body. 
Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d 435, 436 (1968) 
(emphasis added). In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned 
that any other result would penalize the doctor who honestly 
advised his patient of the undisclosed mistake while protecting 
the physician who would not disclose his mistake until after the 
limitations period expired. jCd. at 436. 
The Christiansen decision is premised on the unequal know-
ledge existing between the expert and the layman in the complex 
3(...continued) 
of Appellant at 5. The facts of Hanebuth are nearly identical to 
those found in Myers. The case involved a helicopter crash in a 
remote area of Alaska; the wreckage was not discovered until after 
the limitations period had run. Obviously, a plaintiff cannot 
learn of a defendant's negligent act until the injury and the 
instrumentality are discovered. 
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area of medical diagnoses and on the inability of the plaintiff 
to learn of the presence of the foreign object. Moreover, lear-
ning of the presence of the object, not the legal cause of the 
action, is what triggers the statute. Because Atwood knew at the 
time of the occurrence that he was injured by a product manufac-
tured by Ruger, there is no similar unequal knowledge and Atwood 
knew of the cause in fact of his injuries. 
The plaintiff's reliance on the medical malpractice case of 
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), is also misplaced. 
The Foil case involved interpretation of the limitations provi-
sions of section 78-14-4 of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
Section 78-14-4, unlike the general limitations period involved 
in Christiansen, includes an express discovery rule which re-
quires a plaintiff to commence an action within two years after 
the patient discovers or should have discovered the injury. The 
application of the discovery rule in Foil was mandated by the 
Utah legislature and was not a judicial response to "exceptional 
circumstances.ff 
The discovery rule has also been applied judicially to an 
action for professional negligence against surveyors when the 
purchaser had no reason to suspect that the survey was in error 
or that the invisible boundaries of the property were not located 
where they were believed to be. Klinger v. Kightly, 130 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1990). As in Christiansen, the Klinger 
decision applied the discovery rule to protect lay persons who 
- 13 
were unaware of their damages from the errors of professionals. 
In such situations, the lay person cannot know he has been 
harmed; the complex nature of the problem is the reason for 
seeking the assistance of a professional in the first instance. 
As explained by the Court of Appeals in a legal malpractice 
action: 
We think that fundamental fairness also requires the 
imposition of the discovery rule because the attorney-
client relationship is based upon trust, and is a 
situation in which one less knowledgeable must rely on 
another, who has special expertise, for advice and 
assistance. 
Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16, 18 (Utah App. 1989). The in-
stant case does not involve any undetectable injury, any fidu-
ciary or special relationship with the defendant, or any reliance 
on defendant's "special expertise," and Christiansen, Klinger and 
Merkley do not apply. 
Plaintiff has presented no "exceptional circumstances" which 
would make application of the statute of limitations unjust or 
irrational. Indeed, to not apply the statute under these cir-
cumstances would be unjust and irrational, and would eviscerate 
the entire basis of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff has at 
all times known that he was injured by the accidental discharge 
of his Ruger revolver. Plaintiff believed the safety was engaged 
when the revolver discharged. Plaintiff knew that the revolver 
was manufactured by Ruger. Plaintiff apparently chose not to 
investigate the possibility of Rugerfs liability for his gunshot 
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wound. Application of the statute of limitations under these 
circumstances is both just and rational. 
B. Plaintiff's Claim Is Further Barred Because 
He Knew of His Legal Rights Months Before the 
Limitations Period Expired. 
Plaintiff concedes that he learned of the existence of a 
potential legal cause of action "in the spring of 1988," several 
months before the expiration of the limitations period. (R. 53.) 
Even if plaintiff's receipt of legal advice was a relevant event 
for purposes of the discovery rule in general, plaintiff would 
not be entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule in this 
case. Plaintiff cites no case in which a plaintiff admittedly 
discovered both his injury and the existence of a potential legal 
action before the statute of limitations expired and was never-
theless allowed to apply the discovery rule to toll the statute 
of limitations. 
This court has held that the discovery rule does not apply 
to a plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries of damages and a 
possible cause of action before the limitations period expires. 
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 
1370 (Utah 1987). In Paulsen, BYU acknowledged that it dis-
covered both the pipes leaking underground and the improper 
installation of those pipes before the statute of limitations 
expired. In rejecting BYU's discovery rule argument, this court 
held that "the discovery rule has no application where an action 
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easily could have been filed between the date of discovery and 
the end of the limitation period." Paulsen, 744 P.2d at 1374. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff has admitted that he received, 
in the spring of 1988, legal advice from his attorney about his 
possible product liability action against Ruger. (R. 53.) 
Still, plaintiff failed to file before the statute expired. 
Obviously, this action could easily have been filed in the se-
veral months between the date plaintiff was informed of his 
potential claim by his attorney and the end of the limitation 
period. Accordingly, th> discovery rule does not apply and the 
claim is barred by the four-year limitation period. 
POINT II 
BARRING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM DOES NOT VIOLATE 
THE "OPEN COURTS" CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTI-
TUTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD A REASONABLE 
TIME AFTER ACCRUAL OF HIS CAUSE OF ACTION IN 
WHICH TO FILE SUIT. 
Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that applica-
tion of the four-year limitations period to this case would 
violate the "Open Courts" clause of the Utah Constitution. (See 
R. 46-51.) An argument not presented in the trial court is 
waived. Johnson v. Department of Employment Sec, 782 P.2d 965 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Even had plaintiff made the argument below, it would be 
without merit. Plaintiff relies on this Court's opinions in 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), and 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). Those 
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cases are fundamentally different than the present case, in that 
they involved statutes of repose, not statutes of limitations. 
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the distinction is crucial. 
The statutes of repose in Berry and Horton were held uncon-
stitutional under the Open Courts clause because they eliminated 
remedies before a cause of action had accrued. In contrast, a 
statute of limitations merely cuts off an existing right of 
action a reasonable time after the claim accrues and does not 
violate the "Open Courts" clause of the Utah constitution. 
McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989). 
Thus, operation of the statute of limitations in the case at bar 
did not bar plaintiff's claim before it accrued and, therefore, 
does not violate the Open Courts clause. To adopt plaintiff's 
argument would be to hold that all statutes of limitations are 
invalid. 
Nor can plaintiff contend that four years from accrual of 
the cause of action is an unreasonably short period of time 
within which to file the complaint. As mentioned above, plain-
tiff knew from the moment of the occurrence that he was injured 
by the accidental discharge of his Ruger revolver. A requirement 
that plaintiff file his action within four years of that date is 
certainly reasonable.4* Clearly, application of the statute of 
* The limitations period for such actions in many states is 
significantly less than four years. See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 12-542 (two years); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. S 340(3) (one 
year); Colo. Rev. Stat. S 13-80-102 (two years); Idaho Code S 5-
219 (two years); 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, U 13-213 (two years); 
(continued...) 
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limitations to plaintiff's case does not offend the Open Courts 
clause. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S PERIOD OF RECUPERATION IS NOT AN 
INCAPACITY WHICH TOLLS THE RUNNING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiff's final argument is that the statute of limita-
tions should be tolled for the period of his two-week hospital 
stay. Under Utah law, the limitations period was not tolled 
during that two-week period. 
In order for the statute to be tolled on account of dis-
ability, plaintiff must fall within the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-12-36. That section provides: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other 
than for the recovery of real property, is at the time 
the cause of action accrued, either under the age of 
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of 
the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
Plaintiff claims that the statute applies because he was "totally 
incapacitated" during his recuperation.5 This is obviously not 
the sort of disability the statute contemplates. Instead, the 
*(...continued) 
Nev. Rev. Stat. S 11.190 (two years); Or. Rev. Stat. S 30.905 (two 
years). 
s
 While plaintiff certainly suffered a serious injury, the 
evidence does not support his claim that he was "totally 
incapacitated" during his recuperation. Plaintiff testified in 
his deposition that he walked into the hospital on his own 
following the accident. (Supp. R. 78.) He underwent emergency 
surgery, and had an essentially uneventful recuperation. (Supp. 
R. 78-83.) 
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statute requires "mental incompetentce]" sufficient to support 
appointment of a legal guardian. Any temporary physical dis-
ability experienced by plaintiff immediately after his accident 
does not constitute mental incompetence. 
Thus, the district court correctly rejected plaintiff's 
argument that the statute of limitations be tolled while he 
recuperated from his accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests that the order of the district court be 
affirmed. 
DATED this ff^ day of May, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
H. Jkmes\$legg 
Rodney R. Parker 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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